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A B S T R A C T
The paper argues that if Macedonia is about to enhance resilience to natural and man made disasters it must con-
sider effective critical infrastructure protection. Identifying critical infrastructures that need to be protected, among oth-
ers, will enable Macedonian society to withstand, absorb, adapt to the new situation and to bounce back effectively. Dur-
ing the research we have identified two problems. First there is no national consensus of what resilience means. Second
there is no identified list of critical infrastructures that need protection through the concept of »all hazards approach«
embedded in the national disaster risk and reduction concept. Therefore the paper first discusses the concept of resilience
as seen by different branches of science in order to establish a framework for further examination in Macedonian context.
In the second part we examine how the concept of critical infrastructure protection against all types of hazards could be
placed in Macedonia. In the third part of the paper we argue that without coherent state strategy for critical infrastruc-
ture protection Macedonia risks to endanger disaster/crisis management system’s resilience. Finally we provide some
recommendation.
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Introduction
At the last UN Special Thematic Session on Water
and Disasters held in New York on the 13th of March,
Japanese Crown Prince Nahurito used the term resil-
ience in context of creating synergies of the old and the
new approaches towards disaster risk reduction:
»If we combine available means such as early warning
systems, education and governance with lessons from
history, we can create a society more resilient to disas-
ters1«.
Misha Hussain from the Guardian identifies the term
resilience as the newest sexiest word in international de-
velopment. Having in mind that there is no universally
accepted definition of the word resilience he is rightfully
asking the question is it just a new buzz word or a devel-
opment solution2.
With the Sendai Report from 20123 the World Bank
commits itself for the years to come to better understand
and design long term disaster resilience in the most vul-
nerable areas on Earth. Additionally in this particular
Report we can also see some other definitions currently
used for the concept of resilience:
»The ability of a system, community or society ex-
posed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and
recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and effi-
cient manner« – United Nations International Strategy
for Disaster Reduction.
»The ability of a social or ecological system to absorb
disturbances while retaining the same basic structure
and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organiza-
tion, and the capacity to adapt to stress and change« – In-
tergovernmental Panel for Climate Change.
»The ability of countries, communities and house-
holds to manage change, by maintaining or transforming
living standards in the face of shocks or stresses – such as
earthquakes, drought or violent conflict – without com-
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promising their long-term prospects« – Department for
International Development, United Kingdom.
So, crowned princes, journalists, governments and in-
ternational organizations are using the word resilience
in their own search for better solutions in reducing risks
from natural and manmade disasters. But what does it
mean exactly? Can or should the world unify the mean-
ing of resilience?
This paper represents our joint contribution to this
debate this time connected with the issue of protection of
critical infrastructure in Republic of Macedonia. In this
context we argue that achieving resilience of critical in-
frastructure protection against natural and manmade di-
saster is more about the process than the final product.
The process itself should be a combination of planning
activities and policy development on national level with
decentralized implementation.
Material and Methods
The method that was used during writing this article
was a combination of policy analysis and literature re-
view. In the first chapter of the article we examine the
term resilience, its origins and definitions. By choosing
one of them and translating it in Macedonian context we
show in practice that resilience can be a catchy phrase
but it can also mean something more, driver of change.
In the second chapter we introduce the term critical in-
frastructure in relation to disaster risk reduction and cri-
sis management. With this chapter we are aiming to
stress the importance of the interconnected relations be-
tween resilience and critical infrastructure protection. In
the third chapter we go in depth of how is actually criti-
cal infrastructure protection organized in Republic of
Macedonia, by identifying the legal framework and the
variety of different authorities dealing with this issue.
With the fourth chapter we are identifying gaps in the
area of managing the process of critical infrastructure
protection in Macedonia and we identify possible ele-
ments of that process that need to be improved. Our con-




The word resilience comes from Latin resilîre with
meaning to spring back. Usually it is used as an adjective
describing someone’s (system or individual) characteris-
tic of returning to the original form or position after be-
ing bent, compressed, or stretched or recovering readily
from illness, depression, adversity, or the like. It entered
the world of psychology with Victor Frankls’ »Men’s
searching for meaning« in 19464. Victor Frankl was a
psychologist, survivor of the Nazi camps, and spent his
entire professional life exploring the ability of the human
brain to withstand hard times and survive by giving per-
sonal meaning to the events. Even when he was in the
concentration camp he was curious in finding the reason
why do some people survive and others don’t. He ex-
plains that is not due to pure physical health, because the
conditions in the camps were horrible but due to the will
of the soul to survive by projection of a goal and a reason
to live. For some of the fellow prisoners’ survivors he
found out that the mental projections are their families
and the dream of reunion. For him personally it was the
idea to become professor in psychology and to teach stu-
dents about the resilience of human nature in stress situ-
ations. Surveying the science campus of ecology the term
resilience is used in correlation of stability and ability of
a system to withstand a disturbance and adapt to chan-
ged circumstances5. Civil engineers understand it as a ca-
pacity of an element or a system to face and absorb the
impacts produced by a stressing factor by rapidly rees-
tablishing balance6.
If I would search for one element in the above men-
tioned definitions that unites all of them, it would defi-
nitely have to do something with »change management«.
There has to be a change caused by external or internal
factors and that change needs to be managed in order the
system to preserve its core functions. Accordingly, psy-
chology recognizes the stress factor from the outside en-
vironment and by successful management of the changes
that are caused we judge if a system is resilient or not.
Civil engineers are measuring the level of endurance of
system from the outside pressures up to the breaking
point in order to manage those circumstances so that the
system prevails. Ecologists are adapting the system to
the new conditions and in that sense adaptation equals
conducting techniques for change management. So the
common denominator for various resilience definitions
would be change management.
In order to narrow down my hypothesis I will focus
my attention on resilience to natural and manmade di-
sasters and the changes that need to be managed caused
by these events. If we understand disaster management
phases as a continuum process, showed in Figure 17, we
can easily relate prevention, mitigation, preparedness,
response and recovery with the process of withstanding,
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Fig. 1. Disaster management phases.
absorbing, adapting to the new environment and bounc-
ing back, all of them core elements of resilience.
Having said this there are two strands that can be no-
ticed in disaster management policies when we speak
about resilience. The first one is called engineered resil-
ience and is focused mainly on the time that is needed for
a system to bounce back from an external shock. In that
way we judge systems as resilient to disasters if the sys-
tem spends less time to recover from the event. This ap-
proach has its foundation in the understanding of sys-
tems as highly organized entities with complicated parts
but with predicted relations. If we understood the parts
of the system and if we enforce the appropriate action we
will receive an expected outcome. One of the traps that
are hidden in this approach is narrowing down the focus
on the trigger event and advice for structural measures
only to deter external shocks. By focusing only on the
speed of »bouncing back« or »normalization« we might
replicate the same structures that caused the disaster in
the first place. Restoring normal conditions of life after a
disturbance (natural disaster) implies the question what
is normal and normal according to whom?
Figure 28 represents how shocks (disasters) might in-
fluence on our social systems and affect the level of devel-
opment. The thick vertical line will go down proportion-
ally to the vulnerability of the system and in that way it
might give us a rough picture of the level of resilience of
the system. After the shock the recovery process might
go up again with the same line and the system will
bounce back in very short period of time but it will create
the same vulnerabilities that caused the disaster in the
first place. Additionally the author of the model is giving
us three other options for the recovery process to con-
tinue. The first one is never to achieve the same level of
development and the other two are slowly progressing in
what we call »building back better«. These two lines of
the graph are connected with the second strand in disas-
ter management towards understanding of resilience. It
is a combination of preparedness thinking and complex-
ity theories refer it as evolutionary resilience. It means
that systems change due to external shocks (disasters)
and trough internal evolutionary path. According to (add
reference) when a system achieves maturity the level of
resilience is at its lowest level leading to change that will
open a window of opportunity for another loop of grow-
ing and maturity. The key of this strand is to actually
manage the process of change that inevitably happens to
a system. Therefore resilience should be understood as a
proactive approach towards disaster management and in
all of its phases (prevention, mitigation, preparedness,
response and recovery). Having said this resilience should
be seen more as a constant process of creating safer com-
munities rather than an outcome that we need to mea-
sure. Finally bouncing back as one of the catchy phrases
explaining resilience should be replaced with bouncing
forward.
We can easily explain this with the case of Macedonia
and our national efforts in disaster risk reduction. Mace-
donian system for disaster management is far from being
perfect. We have unique design in the world where two
national institutions are claiming the right to lead this
process within the country. The first one is Protection
and Rescue Directorate which has operational capacities
for first response in case of natural and manmade disas-
ters, jurisdiction in preparedness planning, prevention
and mitigation activities. The second one, Crisis Manage-
ment Center, coordinates all the actors in order to pre-
vent possible crisis to happen (caused not only by natural
and manmade disasters but also by criminal activities,
acts of terrorism, civil unrests etc.), to coordinate the re-
sponse of the state if a crisis is declared by the Govern-
ment and in normal times to manage the national early
warning system and the upcoming establishment of the
E-112 number. In the mean time almost every year in
spring time we have flesh floods and during summer
time wild fires. These small scale disasters that we are
experiencing almost on yearly basis are extremely costly
for our national economy and they did took few human
lives which makes them even more serious. In summer of
2012 we’ve lost four lives due to the wild fires and this
year one man was drowned in the floods. Despite this the
system for disaster management persists to be rigid and
changes are few and usually reactive rather than proac-
tive. I found it very hard to explain how it is possible that
today in 2013 in Macedonia with all the technology that
the national hydro-meteorological service possesses, with
vast coverage of wireless and communication network
across the country, with free media existing and two in-
stitutions responsible for disaster management in place,
there are testimonies of the flood survivors saying: »We
woke up this morning and everything around us was
flooded«. It is rightfully to ask what happens with the
early warning system and where were the risk assess-
ments and the contingency plans of the municipalities
and the state for these types of scenarios. The main di-
lemma addressed with this article is have we proven as
resilient in this last case with the flesh floods or not?
Using the engineering approach toward resilience the
answer will be YES. The system experienced external
shock, the Government and the municipalities reacted
upon it, mechanisms for damage compensation were acti-
vated, we have lost only one live and in couple of days the
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Fig. 2. Impacts of shocks and recovery.
system restored its normal functions. On the other hand
if we follow up the approach towards resilience as change
management the answer in this particular case will be
NO. We have bounced back to our old vulnerabilities and
now we are waiting for the new season to come and re-
peat the same mistakes. There is no media attention in
the moment, there is no public pressure and nobody is
asking for responsibility of the absence of early warning
systems and risk communication in Macedonia. There is
no progression in formulating detailed risk assessment
and develop better contingency plans and therefore no
management of change has happened. We are back in the
old days when disasters were explained only as acts of
God and we are helpless to do anything about it.
This recent example, among many other, raises the
question whether or not Macedonia has appropriate stra-
tegy of how to bounce forward, i.e. (effectively prevent,
mitigate, respond adequately with appropriate prepared-
ness and recover). In other words do we have appropriate
approach in protecting what is critical or at least what so
far has proven to be critical in order to boost these infra-
structures resilience or not?
The reason for such question also comes from inter-
national experience where many countries recently have
increased focus on the concept of resilience and all haz-
ard protection. Macedonian concept is similar to these
countries’ experience. Nonetheless in applying strategies
for comprehensive protection focused on all hazard ap-
proach and resilience these countries have identified crit-
ical infrastructures to their national security. Macedonia
so far has done little in such identification. Thus before
we address the issue of protection critical infrastructure
in Macedonian as a part of the »all hazards« approach
under current disaster risk reduction concept and crisis
management we will briefly explain the logic behind this
approach.
Linking resilience and critical infrastructure
protection
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is currently
seen as an essential part of national security in numer-
ous countries around the world. Center for Security
Studies from Zurich in its two focal reports for 2008 and
2009 on CIP have identified several trends in this area.
First, many countries pay increasing attention to the
concepts of resilience and all-hazard Approaches;
Second, this has direct implications for how CIP is or-
ganized: A move towards the centralization of responsi-
bility in this policy domain can be observed;
Third, there is continued or even growing attention to
the cyber-dimension of the issue, linked to the growing
awareness that the globally connected information and
communication technologies have become a particularly
vulnerable part of every country’s national infrastruc-
tures (often also discussed under the heading of »cyber-
war«)9.
Fourth, energy infrastructure protection: expanding
governance and international cooperation and
Fifth, public-private partnerships: new relationships
and challenges10.
Governments that follow this approach believe that
ability of one’s system to withstand, absorb, adapt to the
new situation and to bounce back would be best achieve
through identified critical infrastructures that need to be
protected. As a result broad range of political and admin-
istrative initiatives and efforts to improve the security of
these infrastructures are underway in the US, in Europe
as well in other parts of the world.
Three other reasons also urge countries that apply
comprehensive all hazard approach and resilience in
their national security strategies to identify critical in-
frastructures that need protection. First it is more prac-
tical (for the operational level). Second technical reason
(i.e. achieving necessary standardization) and finally, fi-
nancial reasons (it is les costly)9.
International trends and experience in this area also
show that in general countries are using two models of
prioritization (i.e. identification of critical infrastruc-
ture). First model, countries distinguish between critical
infrastructures that deserve a greater level of attention.
Second, countries identify vital points within a critical
infrastructure.
The benefit of applying »all-hazards« approach is that
it enables the country to develop comprehensive protec-
tion regardless of the threat. The main focus here is on
the system’s capability to respond to a whole spectrum of
unanticipated events. To achieve such capacities all sta-
keholders (public and private) need to develop their secu-
rity systems to a point where the system is able to re-
cover from adversity, to restore it either to its original
state or to a modified state based on new requirements.
In other words as we have already mentioned above to
create greater resilience. However it is worth mentioning
here that these capacities (that ensure grater resilience)
are build under different approach that is distinguished
from just defensive oriented measures (understood as in
classic conventional defense systems).
Although protection is integral part of the resilience
of the system, greater resilience is usually achieved through
commonly embedded processes inside and out side the
system. These processes are established on the synergies
between the various stakeholders not just in side the
country’s security system but also between stakeholder
on regional level or global through different organiza-
tions (such as NATO, EU for example).
Additional important benefit that this approach en-
sures is that it protects each-stakeholder interest. Giving
that modern threats that come from terrorism, orga-
nized crime and recently potentially from state actors are
critical infrastructure oriented and that natural disas-
ters could severely endanger our safety and security by
endangering critical infrastructure that ensure our ev-
eryday lives, protecting these infrastructure becomes
crucial. It ensures our wellbeing through protection of
systems and services that they provide, but at the same
time through this protection it ensures business efficien-
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cies and continuity. Therefore improving resilience of
critical infrastructure is in each stakeholder’s interest.
Macedonia so far has experienced both devastating
natural disasters and terrorist attack. Skopje earthquake
in (1963) forever changed the image of the city. In addi-
tion flesh floods, and wild fires represent constant chal-
lenge each year causing significant material costs and ir-
reparable damage to the environment. On the other
hand recent trends of global terrorist threat seem that
did not overcome Macedonia. Although many have ar-
gued that radical Islam is present in the South East Eu-
rope, Jasharevic’s attack on US embassy in Bosnia, at-
tack at so called Smilkovci Lake in Macedonia and the
attack on the Israeli tourists in Bulgaria, clearly con-
firmed that the threat from radical Islamists ready to
commit terrorist attacks is real11. Both of these attacks
were on direct infrastructure that could be considered as
critical in a narrow context (U.S. embassy in Sarajevo-
-Jasarevic case and ground transportation system at Bul-
garian airport) or critical in a broader context (endanger-
ing public safety by executing civilians-fishermen randomly
picked up by the suspect terrorist)11. Hence importance
of protecting critical infrastructure in Macedonia is un-
doubtedly top priority.
Protecting critical infrastructure in Republic of
Macedonia
Closer look at Macedonian crisis management system
(including national defense, internal security and civil
protection – their relations and functions) will show a
significant shortfall when it comes to critical infrastruc-
ture protection. Precisely there is absence of systematic
lists of objects, condition or infrastructures marked or
identified as a critical for the purpose of their protection.
However this does not mean that disaster risk reduction
concept could not be applied in conducting system analy-
ses in order for one to come out with conclusions and ac-
cordingly to provide recommendations.
Giving that Macedonia follows all hazards approach
in resilience building one could still determine the qual-
ity of resilience to man made and natural disasters crises.
More or less in previous discussion we have emphasized
the link between resilience in all hazards approach (con-
cept embedded under disaster risk reduction concept)
and CIP. Thus it is clear that still one could analyze the
system of CIP in Macedonia. To understand how CIP is
organized and function one should take a closer look in to
Macedonian legislation for critical infrastructure protec-
tion (if there is any), operational design built under the
institutional context (stakeholders and their role), and
how emergency response, preparedness and recovery are
transferred in to practice.
Using analogy of how other states »pump« their resil-
ience under the all hazards approach strategies through
CIP it is clear that this analysis should look in several ex-
isting laws. Macedonian legislation explained under di-
saster risk and reduction management approach gravi-
tates over the, Crisis Management Center12, Ministry of
Interior13, Protection and Rescue Directorate14, Ministry
of Defense15, Ministry of Transport and Communica-
tion16, Directorate for Protection of Classified Informa-
tion17, Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning18.
Since there is no clear dedicated list of critical infra-
structure further legal segmentation follows regarding
the anticipated roles and service support for successful
CIP. However, all of these documents include acts defin-
ing the responsibilities of the government authorities in
case of emergencies as well as legislation dealing with is-
sues – such as technical IT security for example17. Some
laws or regulations also contain responsibilities for pri-
vate stake holders on a local level as well. International
legislation further facilitates legal background for CIP in
Macedonia. This is understandable since cyber-security
and environmental protection are on the security agenda
in most of the international organizations to whom Mac-
edonia is party.
One could observe this legislative in two directions.
First, obligations incorporated from Macedonian’s mem-
bership of these organizations (or willingness to join). In
this context further legislative support comes from the
fact that almost all critical infrastructures rely on energy
and telecommunications for support. Second, most of the
services that provide this support in Macedonia are own-
ed or operated on a commercial basis (foreign private en-
terprises). Consequently, all bilateral and multilateral
agreements in this regards have to be considered. Since
these corporations in Macedonia run their security based
on Macedonian private security agencies from legal point
of view, one should also take into account the Act for se-
curity of property and personnel.
In sum, Macedonian legislation for CIP does not cen-
tralize responsibility only in one governmental authority.
It consists of both, provisions that directly locate respon-
sibility and the leading role of specific agency (we will
also refer to this later), and provisions that imply respon-
sibility (regarding the bilateral business agreements and
corporate security). Speaking in terms of Penal code act
CIP’s regulations have also preventive role. Neverthe-
less, it could be argued that legal basis for CIP in Mace-
donia more or less, draws the organizational structure of
governmental authorities involved in this process.
Macedonian institutional context for CIP is also high-
ly influenced by regional and international organiza-
tions’ initiatives and their respective documentations.
Many international organizations are dealing with this
challenge and have taken steps to raise awareness, estab-
lish international partnerships, and agree on common
rules and practices. European Union (EU), the Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the G8
Group, NATO, the OECD, the United Nations (UN), and
the World Bank Group are just some of these organiza-
tions that have influence which institutions will design
national institutional context for CIP. In its resolution
UN Resolution 57/239 from December 2002 the UN Gen-
eral Assembly outlined elements for creating a global cul-
ture of cyber-security, inviting member states and all rel-
evant international organizations to take account of them
in their preparations for the summit19. In December
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2003, UN Resolution 58/199 further emphasized the pro-
motion of a global culture of cyber-security and the pro-
tection of critical information infrastructures20.
Over the past decade, some important projects have
been initiated in support of strengthening disaster risk
reduction actions across South East Europe, which even-
tually affected Macedonian national institutional context
for CIP. In 2000, the Stability Pact for South East Europe
launched the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Ini-
tiative (DPPI SEE)21. Support to DPPI SEE has also
been acknowledged by the World Bank. In 2007, World
Bank with European National Platforms for disaster risk
reduction and Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015
(HFA) national focal points, in partnership with the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), initiated the
South East Europe Disaster Risk Management Initiative
– SEEDRMI. In 2007 another initiative from the World
Bank, the WMO and the United Nations, through the In-
ternational Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR),
initiated the South Eastern Europe Disaster Risk Mitiga-
tion and Adaptation Program – SEEDRMAP.
Crisis Management Center (CMC), Protection and
Rescue Directorate (PRD), Directorate for Protection of
Classified Information (DPCI), Ministry of Interior (MOI),
Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Transport and
Communication (MOTC) and Ministry of Environment
and Spatial Planning (MOESP) build the list of govern-
mental authorities directly involved in Macedonian CIP.
There is no single leading governmental authority in
Macedonia in this process. Which government authority
will lead the overall process in CIP process (i.e. control
and coordination) is situation-dependable.
Since 2009 Macedonia is 11th country that has estab-
lished National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction
(NPDRR) under the HFA 2005–2015. From security point
of view the basis for NPDRR is also supported by the Na-
tional conception for defense and security from 2003 and
the National security strategy of Republic of Macedonia
from 2008. As a nationally owned and led forum of all
risk reduction stakeholders NPDRR should provide coor-
dination, analysis and give proposals for priority actions’.
This requires concentrated activity, through the coordina-
tion and active involvement processes of the competent
authorities. NPDRR covers competent crisis manage-
ment state institutions, scientific and academic institu-
tions, NGOs, the Red Cross as well as the business com-
munity. Thus NPDRR is crucial in Macedonian CIP since
it identifies, assess and monitor disaster risks and en-
hance early warning coordination. Responsible authority
for preparation, planning and organizing all of the activi-
ties related to the NPDRR is Crisis Management Center
(CMC). It maintains close relationships with MOI, DPCI,
PRD and MOTC.
Having said this, MOI covers most of the CIP in ordi-
nary situation. Although it is not stipulated by the law13,
virtually MOI is leading governmental authority for CIP
in Macedonia during ordinary-peace time situation. Op-
erating under the MOI, Directorate for security and
counter-intelligence covers not just most of the orga-
nized crime and terrorism issues, but also other issues
regarding the CIP. As a result of the recent crime trend
regarding the money transport issue, as additional im-
plied task for MOI is to provide security for money trans-
port even for the private corporation22. The two most im-
portant agencies that fully support the MOI’s role in CIP
in Macedonia are Protection and rescue directorate and
Ministry of transport and communication.
Leading governmental institution for transport CIP
is Ministry of transport and communications (MOTC). In
defining the transport critical infrastructure in Macedo-
nia MOTC follows NATO’s definition. Beside railway,
and all ground transport infrastructure MOTC is leading
governmental agency in air and water transport CIP too.
MOTC approach in defining transport CIP goes beyond
the transport infrastructure of goods and people. It also
recognizes energy transport infrastructure (gas and gas-
oline) and telecommunication and internet infrastruc-
ture. MOTC practice this responsibility in coordinated
support manner. MOI and MOD provide main assistance
and enable MOTC successfully to coordinate transport
CIP. However, information CIP and coordination for
transport CIP with private sector is also highly involved
in MOTC planning of transport CIP.
In the area of environmental protection and preven-
tion of industrial accidents the lead is by the Ministry of
Environment and Spatial Planing (MOESP) mainly
through implementation of the EU SEVESO Directive
and the Convention for cross border effects of industrial
hazards.
Protection of the information is crucial part of the
overall CIP in Macedonia. Leading governmental agency
for information protection (including critical informa-
tion) is Directorate for protection of classified informa-
tion (DPCI)17. MOI’s Directorate for security and coun-
ter-intelligence is in close relation with the DPCI and
provide crucial data and efforts to DPCI for successful in-
formation protection. As specific part of the overall de-
fense, Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Intelligence agen-
cy play pivotal role in information protection too. All of
the military information protection is run by Military
service for security and intelligence. Inside the MOD
Army of the Republic of Macedonia plan and conduct in-
formation operation (IO). DPCI also has close coordina-
tion with these MOD’s bodies that support DPCI objec-
tives. Macedonian Intelligence agency is in close relation
with MOI’s Directorate for security and counter-intelli-
gence and thus contributes to the overall information
protection. Ministry of transport and communication
(MOTC) also has significant role in information protec-
tion. MOTC manages telecommunication and internet
provider sector and has crucial role for coordination with
the private corporate that run telecommunications and
internet. In the context of the industry information pro-
tection DPCI coordinate all of the activities within the
industry sector. These activities are vigorously coordi-
nated with private sector involved in industry sector in
Macedonia.
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If a crisis is declared, than by the law, situation rap-
idly changes12. During declared crisis the Prime minister
designates the leading person from the standing Steering
committee accordingly. In cases of declared national state
of emergency or war, Macedonian Armed forces will take
the lead. Armed forces are also responsible for providing
protection for designated military and defense infra-
structure even in peace time. However, Armed forces’
role in CIP is also crucial during declared crisis or during
international military operations. During declared crisis
Army of the Republic of Macedonia declares units that
should support civilian crisis management. International
military operations have also brought relatively new role
of the armed forces in the context of the CIP. This basi-
cally includes infrastructure that is used for conducting
military operations abroad.
From all of the above it won’t be that difficult to con-
clude that the organizational structure for CIP in Mace-
donia is highly decentralized and based cross-govern-
mentally trough the agencies (institutions). This network
of institutions consists of institutions with legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judiciary powers, infrastructure facilities of
energy supply companies, information and communica-
tion technologies, infrastructure facilities that ensure
the provision of vital goods, transport and traffic infra-
structures.
General analyses of how emergency response,
preparedness and recovery are transferred in to
practice for Critical infrastructure protection
So far there was no actual response that could serve
as a case example for effective analyses of the CIP in
Macedonia. Therefore analysis that follows will be fic-
tional and oriented toward recent practices. Several ex-
amples that could point positive and negative practices of
existing disaster risk and reduction concept that Macedo-
nia follows and that is base for CIP show that main chal-
lenges that could affect effective CIP are based over dis-
crepancy between legislation and organizational design
and operational reality, effective and coherent risk as-
sessment methodology and clearly defined strategy and
accountability between central and local stakeholders.
At first glance legislation is clear and decisive. It dedi-
cates specific role to specific actors from the public sector
in different situation. This is quite understandable since
disaster risk reduction concept is all hazards oriented.
Arguably in such situations centralized planning is need-
ed. One could argue that NPDRR as a nationally owned
and led forum for risk reduction provides coordination,
analysis and proposals for actions’ priority. Furthermore
as we described above, NPDRR should enable assess-
ment and monitoring of disaster risks and further en-
hance early warning coordination. Leading authority
that organizes all of these processes is the CMC. How-
ever given the capacities that CMC possesses and given
the different security concepts and approaches that other
stakeholders that need to coordinate facilitate and lead
in specific situation follow, serious issues challenge effec-
tive CIP.
Namely, CMC has little capacities to run CIP alone. It
is true that under the NPDRR CMC is just a leading body
that coordinates disaster risk reduction. But it is also
true that supporting bodies (MOI and MOD) follow dif-
ferent security concepts. For example MOI follows EU
approach in dealing with security issues while MOD fol-
lows NATO concepts and standardization. In fact, since
NATO and EU does not see the threats with the same
eyes and does not have the same approach to deal with it
the two most important supporter in CIP does not »speak
the same language« on the ground. For example EU has
its own guidance for CIP 23 and NATO has its own too24.
That logically reflects to organization, chain of com-
mands, standardization (including development of stan-
dard operative procedures) and last but not least logistics
and communications. The issue became even more alar-
ming when CMC adopted UN led concept for disaster
risk reduction. This means that although three concepts
are well developed and could in fact provide effective CIP,
even if there are well designed coordination procedures
there still will be issues. The limited budgets push all of
three supporting institutions to apply or coordinate fun-
ding and support in the area of narrow security concepts
that each one of them is following (i.e. EU, NATO and al-
though rarely UN, respectively).
Furthermore, although NPDRR was envisioned in
good manner so far the reality is alarming. According to
the NPDRR there must be plans for joint exercises and
cooperation and coordination. So far these plans have
seen the light at ministerial level but not on the ground.
There are some partial cooperation on the executive level
(such as for example between the Armed forces and PRD
units for mountain search and rescue) but this is way be-
yond the necessary level for effective CIP.
Clear prove for the above mentioned issues are sev-
eral cases of severe fires where response units were not
able to establish communications with the equipment
that they posses. Usually thanks to the tactical and oper-
ational enthusiasm of the personal involved in the ope-
rations these issues were bridged. In the case of the fire
suppression in one of our oldest monasteries this winter
(Treskavec Monastery, build in the XIV century), the
question that we ask is about the effectiveness of the co-
ordination procedures between the armed forces and the
civilian structures for disaster management in real time
operations for protecting CIP. From one hand there are
speculations that the chief of the Armed forces did not
employ near by units due to the legal barrier (i.e. accord-
ing to the defense law only the President could employ
the Armed forces). And from the other hand CMC local
authorities issued open panic requests to all citizens with
of-road vehicles to approach for help, creating problems
to the ongoing operations that were already in place by
the municipal firefighting service25.
Similarly one might ask the question about the pri-
vate stakeholders’ role in CIP. Many important infra-
structure coming from energy and communications sec-
tors are owned and operated by private stake holders.
Consequently although there are responsibilities that
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they need to follow, everyday security and information
gathering for early warning still resides on private stake-
holders’ capacities and abilities. Additionally different
security concepts among stakeholders that need to coop-
erate under the NPDRR brings us to another significant
issue i.e. effective and coherent risk assessment method-
ology.
The essence of the risk assessment process is designed
by the Law on rescue and protection. In that sense Arti-
cle 11 prescribes the responsibility to all public and pri-
vate organizations to prepare a plan for protection and
rescue against natural and other disasters based on valid
hazard assessment. How the hazard assessment should
be done is given by the Methodology for hazard assess-
ment and the content of the plan for rescue and protec-
tion adopted by the Government in 200626. Based on this
Methodology in 2007 the Government adopted the Na-
tional Hazard Assessment against natural and other
disasters27. The first discrepancy that we can see in the
title and the content of our strategic documents is the in-
consistent use of the terms »risk« and »hazard«. Accord-
ing to the Methodology from 2006 with the National
Hazard Assessment we have identified the hazards that
can cause possible disasters by type and location. But
this is just the first step in doing the risk assessment28.
Hazards are part of the equation that explains what is
risk in context of disaster management: R(risk) = H(haz-
ard) x V(vulnerability). Unfortunately the current Meth-
odology doesn’t lead disaster planers to the next level of
answering the three crucial questions that every risk as-
sessment should address:
– What can happen?
– How likely is that to happen?
– What will be the consequences?
The answer of these questions should give a solid
foundation for disaster planners for future activities in
preventing risks or preparing the system for effective re-
sponse. In order to reach this end data collection and in-
formation shearing between first of all governmental in-
stitutions is a must. We have mentioned before the lack
of valid data base for critical infrastructure facilities or
elements within those facilities. This problem reflects
also on the risk assessment process as well. In this mo-
ment there is no system in placed that will track history
of disasters and their effects (victims, damages, costs
etc.), which creates problems for the planers on all levels
but it creates problems for the scientist as well willing to
do research in this area.
The terrain in Macedonia for a paradigm shift in the
area of disaster management in general is more than
ready. Having said this, the overall responsibility to lead
this process lies with the national top level organiza-
tions. They have to create understanding what do we
want to achieve, to develop flexible frameworks and to of-
fer valid tools to the levels bellow so that we can achieve
results. Centralized planning doesn’t have to mean di-
minishing local initiatives and creativity. If put in placed
properly in the way that gives clear instructions about
the goals that need to be achieved and support the pro-
cess with flexible frameworks it can boost local develop-
ment and lead to excellent solutions.
Effective CIP require clearly defined strategy. So far
Macedonia lacks such document. Given that in the age of
globalization and technological advance the nature of the
threat has changed and the way that security is per-
ceived has also changed protecting critical infrastructure
emerged as an essential task for many security agen-
cies29. New asymmetric threats that come from non state
actors are unconventional and critical infrastructure fo-
cused.
Attacks in Bali, Madrid, London, Moscow, but also at-
tack in Sarajevo, or in Bulgaria attest the above view.
These attacks were on systems and services that they
provide and on which our modern live depends upon. On
the other hand security response requires comprehen-
sive and carefully designed approach due to the evolution
of democratic perceptions and approaches to security. To-
day it is clear that protection of human rights with exces-
sive use of force causing mass casualties and material
damage could be endangered easily due to the development
of technology. Thus confronting asymmetric threats that
come from non-state actors practicing terrorism require
skillful well organized security forces ready to cope with
these threats but at the same time ready to protect hu-
man rights and democratic values. Although identifying
potential infrastructure that could be target is not an
easy job so far has proved as a useful approach in contrib-
uting toward greater security while maintaining demo-
cratic standards.
Developing strategies for protecting this infrastruc-
ture is quite helpful to confront challenges that come
from natural disasters as well. Although we could do lit-
tle to confront actual natural disaster we could do much
more to reduce the reasons that cause it or to mitigate
and manage the consequences with identifying critical
infrastructure. Thus working on prevention and on miti-
gation we build resilience of the system and thus reduce
the consequences from natural disaster.
The strategy for critical infrastructure protection will
also help to designate specific roles for all stakeholders,
since all of them as we have mentioned above, have the
necessity for protection, but not the capacities for doing
it alone. Therefore future strategy must consider all
stakeholders from public and private sectors. This will
serve as a background for future role that each stake-
holder will have in providing such protection.
Discussion
From all of the above it became clear that Macedonia
has quite well designed platform that could easily be
adopted to serve for development of effective CIP. How-
ever, from the discussion above it also became clear that
there are some challenges that require greater attention
if we are about to develop resilient based CIP. Therefore
we will provide some recommendation that could serve
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as a starter but also as a platform for future more detail
research on this topic.
Recommendation regarding the legislation and
institutional context of critical infrastructure
protection in the Republic of Macedonia
Authorities must identify critical infrastructures in
the Republic of Macedonia. This has to be done with offi-
cial document and in accordance with security threats,
and current and existing concept for disaster risk reduc-
tion having the all hazard approach. Accordingly there
has to be official bylaws that will facilitate ministerial
support for critical infrastructure protection through re-
spective sectors functioning in accordance of administra-
tive laws.
Legislation should mandate clarification of roles and
responsibilities for CIP at national and local communi-
ties’ level. In addition it should be bared in mind that
systems and services that they provide are connected
interlinked on regional level. On the other hand today se-
curity requires regional and international cooperation.
Therefore one could not achieve effective CIP without
improving regional cooperation and designate stakehol-
ders that will be responsible for cooperation and collabo-
ration and improving communication between all rele-
vant sectors and agencies responsible for CIP.
To be effective CIP requires efficient and prioritized
allocation of financial and human resources. This needs
to be done in the context of existing disaster risk reduc-
tion policies, or in accordance with the EU guidance for
CIP or NATO based approach and guidance for CIP.
Again there must be leading agency or body without leav-
ing room for falling in to gap where »when two or three
stakeholders are responsible no one is responsible«. We
are aware that this will require sacrifice due to the power
sharing and funds and budgets, nonetheless we are also
aware that national interest highly overruns these con-
siderations too.
Consequently responsible stakeholders must develop
standardized cross-ministerial and cross sector agreed
criteria for CIP. Since the analyses about recent practice
under the NPDRR clearly showed that there is discrep-
ancy between strategic and executive application of cur-
rent crisis management developed under the all hazards
approach there must be a controlling mechanisms. These
mechanisms should ensure that responsible stakeholders
have established appropriate programs, plans and essen-
tial task lists accordingly.
Controlling mechanism should be also developed to
ensure periodical joint exercises with rigorous analyses
of conducted joint activities and exercises with the focus
on the best practices lessons learned from regional global
experiences. These controlling mechanisms should also
consider budget planning for CIP, achieved level of exper-
tise among dedicated personnel for CIP from respective
stakeholders (private and public) with recommendation
for future improvement and reevaluation of the achieved
improvement.
Finally one thing that is lacking in the security sector
in Macedonia and consequently will reflect to the CIP is
the absence of relevant researches in the area. Thus we
believe that if Macedonia is about to build resilience
through CIP it definitely needs to consider building resil-
ience through knowledge advocacy and research. Later
could also serve as a crucial factor in development of ap-
propriate risk assessment methodology for CIP.
One could not achieve effective CIP in the environ-
ment where many stakeholders need to contribute and
when all of these stakeholders have different perception
about the threat. Therefore for effective CIP Macedonia
needs to formalize protocols and unifies methodology
and institutional capacities for integrated collection,
analysis and dissemination of hazards, vulnerabilities
and loss data at the national and local level. Accordingly
this will lead to development of standardized approaches,
tools, methods and information management systems
(with focus on information sharing sentiments) to facili-
tate comprehensive multi-hazard risk assessments,
through implementation of the existing security docu-
ments and in compliance with chosen guidelines (EU,
NATO or UN). Hence comparable multi-hazard risk pro-
files should be developed in line with (chosen guidelines)
considering the regional trends as well. These guidelines
regularly need to be updated, easily available and to in-
clude assessments from and for key sectors (with specific
regard to urban settlements and vulnerable communi-
ties). However, without allocation of sufficient funds and
guarantee that there will be regular investments to sup-
port the development of technical and institutional ca-
pacities to identify, assess and monitor potential threats.
For effective CIP Macedonia needs strategy that will
ensure centralized planning and decentralized execution.
No matter how expensive it might be, Macedonia needs
centralized approach in managing the planning process
in CIP. In fact, Macedonia needs to fulfill the gap between
theory and practice. This will also help to analyze and
further improve existing legislative, organizational struc-
ture, mechanisms and methodology in CIP approach. Re-
cent fatality of terrorist attacks and natural disasters
and their aftermath consequences overrun the costs of
preventive approach to protect critical infrastructure.
In order to be effective in this centralized planning
process Macedonian government needs to coordinate, fa-
cilitate and stimulate all the authorities (especially pri-
vate corporate) that directly or indirectly build security
network in CIP. In terms of coordination recent practice
shows that many governments in fact have established
cross-sector advisory boards for CIP (The National Infra-
structure Advisory Council in the United States; the
Critical Infrastructure Advisory Council (CIAC) in Aus-
tralia; or the Association of Italian Experts for Critical
Infrastructures (AIIC). Since centralized planning is not
new in Macedonian security tradition existing platforms
of this kind (like for crisis management) could serve as
well designed base for CIP Former security was actually
organized in similar manner. It was based on central
planning and central execution. Central planning is cru-
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cial for private sector involvement in this process. Ex-
isting Steering committee for crisis management is good
background to expand on. However, for steering the net-
works indirectly one must have a good knowledge about
the structures and tasks of very different networks in
CIP. The most difficult part probably consists of monitor-
ing all the different networks. The goal of facilitation
should be support of the specific elements of the security
network (especially private corporate) and enable them
to work efficiently by creating a network-friendly envi-
ronment. Governments can promote the networks, advi-
se them (e.g., by creating general frameworks for interac-
tion or by developing model agreements), and sometimes
they even have to grant exemptions for networks from
laws that impede private collaboration. An example for
such a case is the exemption for Information Sharing and
Analysis Centers (ISACs) from the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) in the United States30. Stimulation of
the network is crucial. Sometimes private companies will
have specific concerns with participating in the CIP net-
work which strategy also needs to consider31.
From all of the above it would not be hard to conclude
that Macedonia is on a right way in CIP. Nevertheless,
specific challenges should be address immediately before
it is too late.
Conclusion
The concept of resilience put in context of disaster
risk reduction gives different motion to the overall activi-
ties. It is a proactive approach and much more than just
simple bouncing back or restoring normality after a di-
saster or a crisis. In every socio-economic and political
system there are functions that must be protected in or-
der the system to preserve its core functions. We build re-
silience of those core functions by identifying them, as-
sessing the risks towards them and formulating clear
procedures for their prevalence in times of crisis. In or-
der this approach to be successful the national Govern-
ment needs to speak with one voice and have appropriate
strategy towards the issue. With showing the case of
Macedonia in this regards we think that further en-
hancement of the legal framework which will result with
centralized planning but with decentralized execution
should be the way of creating resilient critical infrastruc-
ture.
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KONCEPT OTPORNOSTI I ZA[TITE KRITI^NE INFRASTRUKTURE OD PRIRODNIH
I ANTROPOGENIH KATASTROFA U REPUBLICI MAKEDONIJI
S A @ E T A K
U radu se tvrdi da Makedonija kako bi pobolj{ala otpornost na prirodne katastrofe mora uzeti u obzir u~inkovitu
za{titu kriti~ne infrastrukture. Identificiranje kriti~nih infrastruktura koje treba za{tititi, izme|u ostalog, omogu}it }e
makedonskom dru{tvu da izdr`i, apsorbira te da se prilagodi novonastaloj situaciji. Tijekom istra`ivanja koje smo pro-
veli identificirali smo dva problema. Prvo, ne postoji nacionalni konsenzus o tome {to zna~i otpornost. Drugo ne postoji
identificiran popis kriti~nih infrastruktura koje treba za{titu kroz koncept »pristup svim opasnostima« ugra|en u na-
cionalnom konceptu smanjenja rizika od katastrofa. Stoga se u radu prvo raspravlja o otpornosti u razli~itim granama
znanosti, kako bi se uspostavio okvir za daljnje ispitivanje u makedonskom kontekstu. U drugom dijelu smo ispitali
kako pojam za{tite kriti~ne infrastrukture od svih vrsta opasnosti mo`e biti postavljen u Makedoniju. U tre}em dijelu
rada tvrdimo da bez koherentne dr`avne strategije za za{titu kriti~ne infrastrukture Makedonija reskira da ugrozi
sustav upravljanja katastrofama/krizama. Kona~no smo dali neke preporuke.
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